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ARTICLES

The National Court of Appeals
Controversy: An Emerging

Negative Consensus
JAMES

I.

A.

GAZELL*

INTRODUCTION

Now, rather than a permanent intermediate court . . . a National

Court of Appeals-I propose [that] we create a temporary and
experimental panel-an Intercircuit Panel-made up of judges of the
[United States] courts of appeals, including, of course, senior circuit judges. We can experiment with that panel for up to five years
by assigning to that panel the task of resolving conflicting holdings
of the several circuits.'
This comment is an excerpt from Chief Justice Warren Burger's most
recent annual speech to the American Bar Association in February,
1985 on the state of the federal judiciary. The proposal contained
in this part of his address represents the latest public sign that even
the nation's highest judicial officer and foremost advocate of structural alteration of the federal court system has begun to lower his
expectation for drastic organizational revision as the most effective
approach for reducing the substantial caseload of the Supreme Court
of the United States as well as for enhancing the appellate capacity
of the national judiciary. (See Fig. 1.)
Burger's less audacious proposal suggests the central theme of
this article: The intermittent but spirited debate in the legal community
over the desirability of a national court of appeals lodged between
the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal has evolved
* Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies, San Diego State
University. B.A., M.A., Roosevelt University; Ph.D., Southern Illinois University.
1. Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A.J. April, 1985
at 88.
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through three stages, each of which involved less drastic recommendations than the preceding periods. As a result, a consensus has begun
to emerge, rejecting not only such proposed structural changes as premature, unnecessary, and inefficacious but also other legislative efforts to supply relief to the nation's highest court and the rest of
the federal judiciary. Consequently, the Supreme Court is left with
no practical choice but to try aiding itself as much as possible (perhaps
in collaboration with other national courts) if it continues to feel
burdened by the caseload. Such self-help may lie in an overlapping
combination of administrative and jurisdictional steps as well as case
law further limiting access to the lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court.
As Fig. 2 shows, the controversy over a proposed national court
of appeals has engendered a spate of articles in the nation's legal
community. These writings have appeared in waves over the last thirteen years, corresponding to the peaks of the three stages through
which the public has evolved: (1) advocacy of a structure to screen
the Supreme Court's caseload, (2) pressure for a general tribunal to
augment federal judicial appellate capacity by hearing cases referred
to it by the nation's highest court or transferred to it from various
federal courts of appeal rather than to regulate the docket of the
Supreme Court, and (3) espousal of a new specialized court, a panel
to hear chiefly intercircuit disputes. Each period constitutes a facet
of this study's central contention as well as a section of this article.
FIG. 2
INCIDENCE OF ARTICLES ON A NATIONAL
COURT OF APPEALS IN LEGAL JOURNALS
Years:
1971:
1972:
1973:
1974:
1975:

0
0
13
16
7

( 0.0%'o)
( 0.0%)
(18.1%)
(22.2°%0)
( 9.707o)

1976:
1977:
1978:
1979:
1980:

8
3
2
0
0

(11. 10o)
( 4.2%)
( 2.807o)
( 0.0%0)
( 0.0%)

1981:
1982:
1983:
1984:
1985:

1 ( 1.4%)
7 ( 9.7%)
9 ( 12.5o)
4 ( 5.607o)
2 ( 2.8076)
72

Total:

(100.1 %*)

*Not 100.0% due to rounding error
Source:

Index to Legal PeriodicalsVols. 16-23 plus Vol. 78 (Nos. 1-8)
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However, before examining the first stage, let us first delve into
the background that served as a prelude to the controversy over the
advisability of a national court of appeals in its drastic, less farreaching and attenuated forms.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

A GROWING SUPREME COURT CASELOAD

The caseload of the Supreme Court began its sharp ascent during
the 1950s, climbing from 1,181 at the start of that decade to 1,862
at the end-an increase of 57.7%. 2 This escalation as well as subse-

quent ones derived from at least five causes: population increase,
national economic expansion, more social and economic legislation,
the greater availability of lawyers for indigents, and decisions of the
Supreme Court itself.3
The rise was sufficient to prompt one member of the nation's
highest bench, Justice Felix Frankfurter, to urge strict docket control
for the Court-that is, restrictive standards for granting writs of
certiorari-as a means of assuring that the growing caseload would
not leave the jurists with insufficient time for study, reflection, and
discussion among themselves and thus impair the quality of their decisions." Nonetheless, he regarded such control as a rear-guard action
against an escalating tide of litigation; for he commented: "No doubt
the most rigorous adherence to the criteria for granting certiorari will
not prevent too many hopeless petitions for certiorari from being
filed." 5 Specifically, Frankfurter and three other associate members
of the country's highest tribunal (Justice Harlan, Justice Stewart, and
Justice Whittaker) reportedly believed that the Court had been
accepting an excessive number of maritime and railroad work injury
6

cases.
B.

PROCEDURAL REGULATION

Since 1925 the Supreme Court has managed its docket through
a passel of devices-such as abstention from other judicial proceedings,
class actions, comity, exhaustion of administrative remedies, justici-

2. REP. OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 57
F.R.D. 573, 614 (1972) [hereinafter cited as STUDY GROUP REP.].
3. Id. at 579-80.
4. Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437, 458-59 (1959).

5. Id. at 460.
6. Lewis, Backlog Growing in Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1959,

at 23, col. 6.
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ability, mootness, political questions, standing to sue, ripeness for
7
review, strict certiorari standards, and standing to sue inter alia.
By 1936 the Court added to this panoply of restraints, which,
as listed by Justice Louis Brandeis, included barriers against friendly
suits, decisions on constitutional law issues before they become
unavoidable, broader rule formulations than necessary to resolve cases
at hand, dispositions of cases at a constitutional level if a narrower
basis for adjudication is possible, consideration of the validity of a
statute unless the appellants demonstrated that they had been harmed
by its operation, and challenges to the constitutionality of legislation
8
by those who had benefited from it.
However, this edifice of restrictions, even if rigorously followed
by the Supreme Court, had merely slowed the stream of petitions
to the nation's tribunal of last resort. Consequently, by the late 1950s,
concern about the Court's expanding docket began to extend beyond
Justice Frankfurter and a few of his colleagues to the general legal
community. For instance, Henry Hart, Jr., a Harvard law professor,
examined the Court's docket for the 1958 term; made cautious assumptions about the time available for the justices to do their work (screening petitions for writ of certiorari, determining jurisdiction for cases
on appeal, studying briefs, attending periodic conferences with colleagues to decide whether plenary consideration of cases is warranted,
hearing oral arguments of the opposing counsel, adjudicating the issues,
and writing opinions); and concluded that "the Court is trying to
9
decide more cases than it can decide well."
In particular, Hart deplored what he regarded as a decline in
the quality of the Supreme Court's output because the justices allegedly
lacked enough time for studying argued cases, deliberating collectively,
preparing opinions, and composing differences among themselves as
much as possible. For this situation he suggested a procedural remedy:
the deferment of votes from the conference stage until the end of
the Court's review because votes on the full consideration of petitions after only cursory attention often presaged the final result. He
expected this mode of handling litigation (concomitant with an obligation among the justices to seek as much institutional unity as possible) would yield a variety of benefits, including decisions based more
7. See, e.g., 43 U.S. Stat. 936-42 (1925); W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL
21-23 (1964); Griswold, Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the FLow
of Cases into the Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 58, 63 (1983).
STRATEGY

8. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
9. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
(1959).
100
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on lawyerly analysis rather than philosophical predilections, fewer concurring and dissenting opinions, and, most importantly, few certification of cases.'"
Not everyone on the nation's highest bench and in the wider legal
community viewed the burgeoning Supreme Court calendar as a serious
problem. Associate Justice William Douglas, for example, scoffed at
"the idea that the Court is overworked, that if the Court were only
relieved by statute or by voluntary action of some of the cases it
would make 'better' decisions."" Rejecting this outlook as a myth,
he maintained that the justices were hearing fewer oral arguments,
writing fewer opinions, experiencing shorter work weeks, and having
more time available for individual reflection and collective discussions.
He attributed the Supreme Court's rising docket to a steady influx
of in forma pauperis (indigents') petitions, the overwhelming number
of which, in his judgment, were so patently frivolous that the justices
needed little time to screen them.' 2
Nevertheless, Douglas joined Frankfurter and Hart in perceiving
the Court's expanding docket from a procedural vista. Stated another
way, Douglas' view of the Supreme Court's caseload implied that,
if this judicial body ever felt overburdened due either to additional
filings or fewer but more complex litigation, the remedy for such a
development was basically internal, depending, for instance, on changes
in the time allotted for oral arguments, opinion writing, the length
of the individual justice's workweeks, as well as the use of appropriate
cases to alter the scope of its discretionary jurisdiction.
C.

PRESSURES FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Pressures for changing the structure of the national judiciary dates
from 1944 when legal scholar Erwin Griswold publicly advocated the
establishment of separate tribunals to relieve the Supreme Court of
some business that would otherwise come before it, especially complicated matters such as tax issues.' 3 In 1960 he reiterated his proposal,"' which came to fruition in 1982 with the creation of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with exclusive, national jurisdic10. Id. at 91, 96, 100-01, 124-25.
11. Douglas, The Supreme Court & Its Case Load [sic], 45 CORNELL L. Q.
401, 402 (1960).
12. Id. at 406-1i.
13. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153
(1944).
14. Griswold, Foreword: Of Time & Attitudes-ProfessorHart & Judge Arnold,
74 HARV. L. REV. 81, 85 (1960); Beecher, More High Court Students Hit Calendar,
Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1961, at 12, col. 4.
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tion to review decisions in the areas of claims against the United States,
customs, and patent infringements. (See Fig. 1.) Furthermore, as a
luminary in the legal profession, Griswold's advocacy probably contributed to the setting up of such well-known specialized tribunals
as the United States Court of Military Appeals in 1950.' Nevertheless,
he sought to help the nation's highest bench through specialized structural changes.
Not until 1967 is anyone known to have openly espoused a general
structural approach to reverse the lengthening Supreme Court calendar.
That year a noted legal analyst, Philip Kurland, urged the creation
of an appellate court to be located between the nation's final tribunal
7
and the various courts of appeal.' (See Fig. 1.) Composed of sevento-nine members (presumably selected the way federal judges have
historically been chosen-that is , by Presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation), the new judicial body would be authorized to
"review, at its discretion, all cases involving the interpretation and
application of Federal statutes and common law, whether arising in
8
state or Federal courts."' Decisions from this court could be appealed9
to the Supreme Court only if they embraced a constitutional issue.'
One ineluctable aspect of Kurland's proposal was to transform
the Supreme Court into an exclusively constitutional tribunal by shifting
its statutory jurisdiction to a new institution. Although aware that
his plan, if enacted, would create another federal judicial layer and
probably delay further the handling of appellate business, he postulated
that the new structure would relieve the Supreme Court of numerous
cases and leave it free to decide only the most salient controversies.
Moreover, he sought to complement his proffered structural alteration by recommending the elimination of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.20
However, Kurland's suggested remedy drew only a scattered
response in the legal community. For instance, one legal commentator, Fred Rodell, charged that complaints about the rising caseload
of the Supreme Court emanated from former law clerks and votaries
15. 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1983).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Historical Note, sec. 211 Judicial Review, at 321, col.

1) (1980).
17. Professor Says Top Court May Limit Scope of Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 1967, at 58, cols. 4-5 (late city ed.).
18. Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less & Explain More, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 126, col. 4 (late city ed.). For the development
of his structural proposal, see Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616 (1974).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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of Justice Frankfurter and that such protests masked an ideological
hostility toward the judicial activism of the Warren Court; for if the
Supreme Court's docket were reduced, opportunities for such activism
would decline." In addition, Justice Douglas continued to deny that
the escalating business facing the country's highest tribunal was a
critical matter, attributing this increase (as he had earlier done) largely
to more paupers' petitions whose review, he asserted, consumed only
a small part of the Court's time.2 2
III.

THE FIRST STAGE:

A

SCREENING STRUCTURE

In 1971 Chief Justice Burger named a seven-member panel of
legal scholars, headed by Harvard Law School professor Paul Freund,
to study the expanding calendar of the Supreme Court and to recommend possible solutions. The official name of this task force was the
Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court (more widely
known as the Freund Study Group or Freund Committee). 23 In 1972
its report was made public. 24
This panel endorsed several procedural and jurisdictional remedies:
the elimination of direct Supreme Court review of three-judge federal
district court decisions, the transfer of inmate petitions to a non-judicial
body for resolution, and increased staff (clerks, librarians, and
secretaries). 5 However, its chief recommendation was the establishment of a structure to screen the caseload of the Supreme Court.
The proposed tribunal, called a national court of appeals, was to
occupy a niche between the country's highest judicial body and the
echelon of federal courts of appeal. (See Fig. 1.) The new structure
was to consist of seven judges chosen on a rotating basis from the
membership of the federal courts of appeal for staggered three-yearterms.' 6 Specifically, the Freund Study Group sought to promote diversity in the composition of the new court by compiling a list of eligible jurists and by filling the initial positions and future vacancies
through alternatively picking the most senior and junior courts of
21. Letters, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 2, col. 3.
22. Douglas, Managing the Docket of the Supreme Court of the United States,
25 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 279, 292-98 (1970).
23. Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court: Is Relief in Sight?, 66 JUDICATURE
394 (1983) [hereinafter Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court]; STUDY GROUP REP.,
supra note 2, at 573; Burger, supra note 1, at 86, col. 1.
24. Weaver, Jr., New Court Urged for U.S. Appeals, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1972, at 1, col. 4.
25. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 611-12 (1973).
26. Id. at 590-91, 611.
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appeals judges on the list." The Study Group admitted that new courts
of appeal judgeships would have to be established to offset the loss
of jurists who accepted appointment to the new court. 2 8
Although the authority of the proposed National Court of Appeals
extended to the resolution of conflicting decisions among federal courts
of appeal, its principal function would have been to review the climbing number of petitions for writs of certiorari, which by the time
the Freund Committee was formed in 1971, had risen to an unprecedented level of 4,515, more than tripling since 1950.29 After
screening these requests, the new tribunal would be empowered to
select about 400-to-450 cases a year and certify them as worthy of
further consideration by the Supreme Court, which would grant review
to whatever portion of those certified cases it desired."
The most prominent public defenders of the committee's report,
not surprisingly, were Freund and Burger, albeit on mostly different
grounds. The Harvard Law School professor who chaired the committee cited five bases for its decision to embrace a national court
of appeals. One reason was the expanding docket of the Supreme
Court, which segued into a second justification: a need to improve
the Court's increasingly burdensome working conditions. A third
explanation was that the first two bases warranted drastic change,
hence the structural proposal, but one which would not exacerbate
the caseload pressures facing the nation's tribunal of last resort. 3'
Consequently, the Study Group rejected several structural alternatives because of various perceived shortcomings. For instance, it
refused to espouse a fifteen-member national court of appeals sitting
in divisions and deciding cases on the merits because the Group viewed
the proposal as too far reaching and as spawning another layer of
appellate review. It declined to endorse a new appellate court whose
docket would consist of disputes referred to it by the Supreme Court,
for the latter would confront the additional work of deciding which
petitions for review merited such references and would also turn the
nation's final court into an exclusively constitutional court freed from
the discipline of statutory interpretation and more able to indulge its
political and social values. It spurned the advocacy of criminal appeals
27. Id. at 591.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 613 (Table 1).
30. Id. at 611.
31. Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A.J. 247,
248-49 (1973) [hereinafter Freund]; Burger, Retired Chief Justice Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group's Composition & Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721
(1973).
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panel because it would deny access for a particular class of appellants
to the nation's highest bench and might become politicized with regard
to issues of criminal procedure. 32
The final two reasons were that the Supreme Court, through its
rulemaking, would enable the new tribunal to become an effective
screening device and that such an appellate body would not amount
to a second supreme court because the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction has always been less than total and subject to the will
of Congress.3 3 In 1983, a decade later, Freund reiterated his support
for such a screening mechanism largely on the basis that proposed
structural alternatives were still deficient.3"
Chief Justice Burger lauded the report of the Freund Study Group
without explicitly endorsing its proposed national court of appeals.
His praise stressed four points. One centered on the composition of
the panel. He said that he deliberately excluded federal judges from
it because he wanted an outside perspective on the Supreme Court's
workload. "We judges," he explained, "tend to become myopic at
times when we undertake to look at our own operations and our own
functioning. We tend to be approving of our own habits and
methods."" His second contention was that the committee's diagnosis
of the Supreme Court's caseload problem was universally accepted-an
assertion to which Justice Douglas would undoubtedly have taken
exception. His third point paralleled Freund's: that the stresses of
a rising caseload on the justices would eventually diminish the quality of their work. 36 Finally, Burger expressed his belief that the proposals of the Freund committee (structural and non-organizational)
deserved serious consideration by the nation's legal community. 7
Of all the Freund Study Group recommendations, the one providing for a new judicial body to regulate the flow of business into
the nation's highest tribunal engendered the most intense widespread
reaction-largely critical. In fact, opposition to this .proposal started
before the public release of the Study Group's report, for some of
its contents had been leaked to the press. 8 For example, retired Chief
Justice Earl Warren reportedly wrote to all his former law clerks stating
his objections and seeking to mobilize their opposition. He also began
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Nov. 11,

STUDY GRoup REP.,

supra note 2, at 584-86; Freund, supra note 31, at 249.

Freund, supra note 31, at 250-51.
See Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 403-404.
Burger, supra note 31, at 722.
Id. at 722-23.
Id.at 724.
See, e.g., Totenberg, 'Miniature' High Court Is Planned, NAT'L OBSERVER,
1972, at 1; Totenberg, Warren Mobilizes Drive to Block Plan for Miniature

Supreme Court,

NAT'L OBSERVER,

Dec. 16, 1972, at 4.
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to emerge as the most prominent critic of the panel's report. Justice
Douglas used a dissent in an unpublicized case to foreshadow his
opposition to the anticipated proposal by contending that the screening of cases for review is "in many respects the most important and,
I think, the most interesting of all our functions."" Furthermore,
he restated his contention that, since most cases coming before the
Supreme Court had already been reviewed by other judicial organiza0
tions, an additional level of consideration was "seldom important.""
For Douglas the Supreme Court was, "if anything, underworked, not
overworked."'" "Our time," he continued, "is largely spent in the
fascinating task of reading petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional
statements." 2 Moreover, he noted that the cases accepted by the Court
for plenary review had remained about the same for the last three
decades.
With the publication of the Freund Committee report, attacks
on it, led by the former Chief Justice, came swiftly. Although no
critic publicly endorsed Douglas' position that the Court may have
lacked enough work, they generally contended that this institution
could manage its caseload more effectively not through structural
alteration but through a mixture of procedural and jurisdictional
43
changes as well as more stringent internal management. Freund and
his colleagues also strongly favored such non-structural approaches,
which they discussed at length in their report.
Criticisms of their report fell under three broad rubrics. The firstand most basic-complaint centered on the subject of institutional
preservation: namely, that the proposed National Court of Appeals
threatened the Supreme Court's status as the final arbiter of disputes
and expositor of the law; for the new tribunal would take over the
docket of the country's highest bench and greatly influence what the
latter could hear. Some opponents of the recommended structure
39. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 175 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Warren, Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group's Composition & Proposals, 59 A.B.A.J. 724
(1973) [same title as Burger supra note 31]; Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1973); Brennan, Justice Brennan
Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Ad-

vised", 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973); Goldberg, One Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb.
10, 1973, at 14; Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J.
253 (1973).
44. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 606-12.
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argued that the Supreme Court's primacy rested, in part, on its right
to determine size and composition of its caseload, even though for
much of its history (specifically, until 1925) its appellate jurisdiction
was largely mandatory. 5 They contended, furthermore, that the
Supreme Court's screening function, because of its inherently subjective nature, could not be soundly delegated to another judicial body
and that the proposed appellate court, because of its short-term rotating
membership, would not even be able to sense what petitions the
Supreme Court might regard as candidates for writs of certiorari.
Because the new tribunal would set national constitutional and statutory
priorities through its screening functions, the nation, according to
critics, would in effect be left with two supreme courts in violation
of the Constitution."' Ironically, those who saw the Supreme Court's
screening work as its paramount function did not discern any conflict with the reported tendency of the justices to spend an average
of only one day a week on this kind of task. One might assume that
the time spent on particular functions would vary directly with their
perceived significance.
A second protest involved the composition of the Freund Study
Group. Some critics intimated that the makeup of this panel was biased
because Chief Justice Burger allegedly wanted a new appellate court
in order to restrict the access of litigants to the nation's highest bench
and selected a committee made up of notable legal scholars who shared
his predilection on this subject. This study group was, in effect, his
mouthpiece, a cachet for his views. 7 The small size of the committee
(seven members), the philosophical compatibility of its members, and
their unanimous support for a new court probably spawned this suspicion, which implicitly questioned the political acumen of the Chief
Justice, who might have been better served by a favorable structural
recommendation from a broadly based panel. Specifically, the
opposition cited the absence of present and past members of the
Supreme Court and other federal jurists from the panel. It noted a
lack of representation from bar associations and legal societies,
although one member of the Freund Study Group, Bernard Segal,
had been President of the American Bar Association and another
panelist, Russell Niles, was Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration.48
45. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 285-86,
294, 299-300 (1927); J. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT 128-29 (1960); Gressman,

supra note 43, at 254-55.

46. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 43, at 729-30; Goldberg, supra note 43, at 16.
47. Warren, supra note 43, at 725-26, 730.
48. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 627-28.
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A third area of discontent concerned methodology. Some
opponents maintained that the research approach taken by the Freund
Committee was flawed. In particular, some critics implied that this
panel lacked statistical competence, which showed in its reputedly uncritical handling of Supreme Court caseload data. The essential mistake
of the Study Group, they contended, despite its disclaimer, was the
equation of a rising caseload with a growing workload. Opponents
intimated that the justices might face less work even in the face of
spiraling litigation if those cases were typically uncomplicated.
However, they might experience a heavier workload despite a
maintenance or decline in the number of suits if the percentage of
complex cases increased.4 9
Some opponents of the Freund Study Group report charged that
it failed to delve into how the justices spent their time on the various
aspects of their job, especially the screening of petitions. Such timeuse analysis was methodologically feasible in 1971 and 1972 when this
committee deliberated, for this mode of research (commonly called
weighted caseload studies) had been developed in 1946 by the
Administrative Office of the United State Courts (a staff arm of the
Supreme Court) to measure the way in which judges in the lower
federal tribunals had allocated their time among the numerous kinds
of civil and criminal cases facing them. These periodic time-use surveys
had supplied valuable data for determining whether additional
judgeships were necessary. According to a recent annual report by
this agency,
there have been attempts to adjust for the differences among case
types by assigning weights which represent the relative amount of
judge time necessary to resolve each type. The theory is that the
((average" case is worth one case, so every type of case is worth
more than, equal to, or less than that number depending on how
time consuming it is. . . .Time studies require judges to record all
of their time spent on each case type over a period of several months.
. . .If a particular case type is one percent of all cases terminated
but takes up two percent of the time spent on all cases, then it takes
twice as long as the average case."
The application of this process to the Supreme Court would have provided
empirical justification for either enlarging this judicial body or establishing
another layer of appellate judges.
Furthermore, on a less methodologically sophisticated plane, some
opponents contended that the Study Group failed to broach the
49. Warren, supra note 43, at 726-27; Gressman, supra note 43, at 254, col. I.
50. ANN.

REP. DIRECTORS AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. 290 (1980).

See also Gazell,

Evolving Conceptions Toward Measuring Judicial Workloads: A National Perspective, II U. WEST L.A.L. REV. 41, 51-53 (1979).
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desirability of a new appeals court with the justices when it interviewed them. It allegedly did not interview a sufficient number of
law clerks (only three) or any federal circuit court judges, the pool
from which the membership of the new tribunal would be drawn.
The panel might also have sought advice from judges on state appellate
courts that had brought their heavy dockets under control." In addition, the Freund Committee received excoriation for its reputedly secret
existence and private sessions, 2 which some critics interpreted as
bolstering their suspicion that this group's recommendation of a national appellate court did not originate with the entire Supreme Court
but instead with only one of its members, Chief Justice Burger, aided
by some like-minded individuals prominent in the nation's legal profession. However, the Chief Justice and his appointed panel probably
knew that any proposal for substantial change in the federal judicial
structure, even if spawned in closed meetings, would have to withstand considerable public scrutiny before having a reasonable chance
of taking effect.
Finally, the Freund Study Group's structural recommendations
drew only modest support from lawyers and judges. The prime reason
for this aftermath was the weight, intensity, and breadth of the
criticisms, particularly those of the former Chief Justice Warren, who
was credited with having virtually assured the demise of the proposed
screening tribunal. A second explanation is that Chief Justice Burger
never publicly endorsed and campaigned for the Freund Committee's
proposed national court of appeals, although he strongly maintained
that this recommendation deserved serious consideration as one possible
solution to the Supreme Court's expanding docket. However, if Justice
Burger had publicly embraced the Freund Study Group's structural
proposal, he might have inadvertently reinforced the suspicion of some
critics that the committee was really a facade to conceal his hand
or the ambivalence of his colleagues in fostering structural change
in the federal judiciary.5 3 Even though legal interest in this particular
measure waned, pressure for some kind of structural alteration in the
federal court system continued and led to the advent of a second stage.
IV.

A

SECOND STAGE: TRANSFER AND

REFERENCE TRIBUNALS

In 1974 the American Bar Association endorsed a national court
of appeals in principle without specifying its functions and composition. The ABA believed that a new appellate organization in one form
51. Warren, supra note 43, at 725.
52. Id.at 725.
53. Id.
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or another was essential to alleviate the Supreme Court's growing
docket.54 Furthermore, that year marked a shift in the kind of new
appellate tribunal advocated for the federal judiciary. Basically, some
legal analysis proposed a second type of national court of appeals,
one that would perform no screening functions but would instead perform the less drastic function of deciding cases transferred to it from
the various federal circuit courts or referred to it by the Supreme
Court. Two notable commissions espoused such a remedy not only
to relieve the caseload pressures on the nation's highest bench but
also to augment the appellate capacity of the federal judiciary.
First, the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice (a thirty-three
member panel headed by legal scholar Maurice Rosenberg) proposed
the establishment of an intercircuit (or nationwide) division of the
federal appellate system to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
rules made by the Supreme Court within limits specified by Congress.
The new structure would feature its own-rather than a rotating5
membership, and its decisions would apply nationally. " The Council's recommendation sought to maintain access to the Supreme Court,
which the screening structure proposed by the Freund Study Group
would have restricted, while lightening its docket. The Council's proposal with its fixed membership was intended to foster predictability
in the new court's rulings, an objective that would probably have
eluded a judicial body with a rotating panel, although the principal
advantage of the latter would be an avoidance of ideological domination. Furthermore, the Council strongly favored supplementing its
structural solution with a variety of efforts to limit the flow of cases
into the United States district courts, which would eventually result
in lower caseloads for the federal courts of appeals and, eventually,
the Supreme Court.56
However, because the Council's work and proposals were
numerous and wide-ranging, its structural recommendation tended to
be obscured. Moreover, it was further eclipsed by the wide-spread
attention paid to the organizational change proposed by a congressionally established task force: the Commission on the Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System, headed by Nebraska Senator
Roman Hruska. 7 This commission consisted of sixteen members,
54. A.B.A. ANN. REP. 182-84, 306-11 (1974).
55. THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, I APPELLATE JUSTICE 1975:
SUMMARY & BACKGROUND 24 (1975).
56. THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, 5 APPELLATE JUSTICE: SUPPLEMENT, PROCEEDINGS, & CONCLUSIONS 127-30 (1975).
57. COMMISSION ON REVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE & INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D.
195-409 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

appointed in equal numbers-four apiece-by the House of Representatives, the Senate, the President of the United States, and the Chief
Justice. 8 Because the Hruska Commission represented collaboration
among the three branches of the national government to consider inter alia the creation of another federal appellate judicial structure and
because congressional consideration of legislation flowed from the work
of the Commission, its suggested paramount remedy warrants more
extensive attention.
This commission unanimously urged the creation of a national
court of appeals. Although the name of the new tribunal was the
same as the panel recommended by the Freund Study Group, the Commission proposal differed in most other respects. The new court was
to consist of seven jurists with Article 3 status-that is, nominated
by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a term of good
behavior."
The proposed tribunal's business was to come from two sources.
One was cases referred to it by the Supreme Court, which would
possess discretion to select the types and extent of referrals within
broad legislative boundaries. If established, such a national court of
appeals would decide which of the referrals to accept for adjudication on the merits and which to decline, unless the Supreme Court
ordered it to resolve a particular referred dispute.6"
The Commission believed that the reference jurisdiction of its
proposed structure might encompass all the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, such as appeals from the decisions of
three-judge federal district court panels and the rulings of the highest
state courts. 6 ' To achieve this goal; the Commission favored a broad
grant of authority to the nation's highest bench to determine which
kinds and how much business should be shifted to the proposed court.
This commission was especially troubled by an increasing proclivity
among the justices to issue opinions, often lengthy ones, protesting
denials of certiorari. To Senator Hruska and his colleagues the incidence of such complaints, which rose with the Court's caseload,
suggested that the appellate capacity of the nation's highest judicial
body was becoming increasingly strained. Its members were growing
more distressed that it was failing to review many controversies which,
in their view, warranted plenary consideration. 62
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A second source of litigation for the Commission's proposed

national court of appeals was to consist in filings from the various
federal courts of appeal that were transferred to it because the public
63
interest manifestly required a speedy, nationally applicable decision.
The Commission offered a pair of illustrations for this avenue of
jurisdiction: (1) tax-law suits where two United States courts of appeal
had issued conflicting holdings and where a ruling by a third such

tribunal would lack national application and (2) complex cases involving environmental questions where a speedy nationwide decision
was "in the interest of [the] efficient allocation of national resources
.

. .

9"64

The Hruska panel forecasted that only a minority of the

overall caseload would come to the proposed judicial body by this
route and that most litigation would flow from the Supreme Court. 65
Moreover, such a tribunal would possess the power to refuse transfer
66
cases because of their nature or its desire for docket control.
This commission summed up its argument for a new judicial
institution by declaring:
The proposed National Court of Appeals would be able to decide
at least 150 cases on the merits each year, thus doubling the national
appellate capacity. Its work would be important and varied, and the
opportunity to serve on it could be expected to attract individuals
of the highest quality. The virtues of the existing system would not
be compromised. The appellate process would not be unduly prolonged. There would not be, save in the rarest instance, four tiers
of courts. There would be no occasion for litigation over jurisdiction. There would be no interference with the powers of the Supreme
Court, although the Justices of that Court would be given an added
discretion which can be expected to lighten their burdens.
The new court would be empowered to resolve conflicts
among the circuits, but its functions would not be limited to conflict resolution alone: It could provide authoritative determinations
of recurring issues before a conflict had ever arisen. The cost of
litigation, measured in time or money, would be reduced overall as
national issues were given expedited resolution and the incidence of
purposeless relitigation was lessened. The effect of the new court
should be to bring greater clarity and stability to the national law,
with less delay than is often possible today.6
In addition, the Hruska Commission's report noted that, since the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Supreme Court would be empowered to review holdings of this national
court of appeals through granting writs of certiorari, the access of
litigants to the nation's highest court would remain."
The Commission's structural proposal resulted in a myriad of
complaints whose cumulative effect undermined all congressional efforts
to turn this recommendation into a reality. Although less intense than
the protests raised against the Freund Study Group's proffered national court of appeals, the rejoinders to the Hruska Commission's
version belong in five categories, which may be illustrated by using
the conclusion of the panel's report.
The first part of the conclusion centered on the extent of national
judicial appellate capacity, which this commission, citing increasing
published dissents from denials of certification, had found to be inadequate. This facet of the summary presupposed that the Supreme
Court would continue to decide annually about the same number of
cases-roughly 150-and that this level of output was still feasible
and appropriate. This aspect of the conclusion was open to the
criticism, implicitly advanced by Professor Freund, that the Commission failed to question whether the nation's highest bench has been
rendering too many holdings and whether a cutback might enhance
their quality, however defined.6 9 Under the Hruska Commission's plan,
the Supreme Court might still grant certiorari to 300 cases a year,
settling approximately 150 of them itself while referring the remaining 150 to the new tribunal. Such an enhancement of federal judicial
appellate capacity would come at the expense of diminishing the
Supreme Court's appellate capacity by increasing its work, for it would
have to select disputes for referral-potentially time-consuming and
divisive for the justices-and later whether to certify appeals from
the new judicial body. All accepted petitions would entail the additional duties accompanying plenary review.
The second part of this conclusion argued that a diversified
caseload would help make membership on the proposed national court
of appeals attractive. A critic might counter that the tax-law and environmental examples suggest routineness rather than variety in the
proposed tribunal's docket. The Supreme Court could reinforce this
condition by referring only appeals concerning statutory interpretation while saving the litigation involving constitutional issues for itself.
Moreover, one might ask whether intercircuit disputes-whether they

68. Id.
69. See, Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 403-04.
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focus on statutory construction, constitutional problems, or both0
are really among the kinds that Supreme Court ought to adjudicate."
The third aspect of the conclusion to the Commission's report
predicted that the proposed national court of appeals would furnish
an opportunity for service attractive to outstanding members of the
legal profession. This facet deserves summary treatment because it
was the only incontrovertible part of the summary.
The fourth-and most extensive-part of this conclusion suggested
that the proposed court, if enacted, would not harm the existing federal
judiciary. This component is the most important facet because it drew
the strongest critics, led by Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg and all his
colleagues on the United State Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Their principal contentions were twofold: that the Hruska Commission had failed to establish the need for a reference-and-transfer
national court of appeal and that this commission had underestimated
the costs of its proposed structural change to the national court system.
To these critics another appellate tribunal was not essential for several
reasons. One was the absence of numerous intercircuit conflicts that
the Supreme Court had declined to settle because of its expanding
docket. A second reason was the limited categories (mostly tax and
patent cases) into which unresolved circuit disputes fell, suggesting
that the appropriate structural remedy should be a specialized court
foreshadowing the one established in 1982 (the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit). A third consideration was the paucity of conflicting intercircuit rulings spawning intolerable legal uncertainties and
thus requiring prompt nationwide resolution."
Such opponents viewed the costs of the Commission's recommended judicial organization as heavier than its proponents admitted.
One alleged price would be a reduction in the power and status of
the federal courts of appeal, which might make these positions less
attractive to potential candidates. Besides, such a national court of
appeals might cast a similar shadow over the prestige of the Supreme
Court, whose justices would choose the cases for the new tribunal
and thus putatively function as if they were super law clerks. This
situation would be exactly the opposite of the one envisioned by the
Freund Study Group in making its screening-court proposal. A second
reputed cost centered on additional delay, expense, and complexity

70. Kaus, A
Jan. 18, 1985, at
71. Feinberg,
(1976); 29 U.S.C.

Sad Violin, Please, for Warren Burger, L.A. Herald Examiner,
A19, col. 5.
A National Court of Appeals?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 611, 614-25
§ 1295 (1982).
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in the federal judicial appellate process. Such alleged problems would
be concomitants of another judicial appellate level and inescapable
jurisdictional ambiguities over the circumstances under which litigation might be transferred to the new court and appealed from it. A
third alleged disadvantage encompassed skepticism over whether the
establishment of such a tribunal was the most cost effective way of
reducing the Supreme Court's docket and enhancing the appellate
capacity of the federal court system. Finally, some opponents feared
that a preoccupation with the creation of such a court to make early
declarations of national law would divert the legal community's
attention from what such critics viewed as the most efficacious route
to lighten the Supreme Court's docket: a search for ways of restructuring the entry of cases into the federal judicial system.72
A fifth aspect of the Commission's conclusion that drew public
criticism focused on the expectation that its proposed national court
of appeals, if established, would provide a higher level of clarity and
stability in the national law and thus reduce filings and delays in adjudication to a considerable extent. Opponents of the proposed tribunal
intimated that, in a complex, rapidly changing society, predictability
in the law was entirely possible and that the proposed judicial body
would be more successful than the Supreme Court in bringing the
country closer to this goal. For critics, uncertainties in the law stemmed
from sources other than ambiguous Supreme Court decisions resulting
from heavy caseload pressures. For instance, Chief Judge Feinberg
cited a persistent federal governmental policy of relitigating unfavorable
decisions in the various circuits in order to provoke conflicting courts
of appeal decisions and increasing the possibility of Supreme Court
review.7 3
Opposition to what turned out to be the principal structural recommendation of the Hruska Commission had appeared at its hearings.
Further resistance became evident at the hearings of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (a
subdivision of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives) in 1977." 5 Such antagonism condemned this proffered judicial
body to the same eventual fate experienced by the Freund Study
72. Feinberg, supra note 71, at 614-19.
73. Id. at 626-27.
74. COMMISSION, supra note 57, at 204; The National Court of Appeals Act:
Hearings on S. 2762 & S. 3423 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-99, 129-50,
201-56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as National Court of Appeals Act].
75. State of the Judiciary & Access to Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Administration of Justice, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
10-55, 83-109, 112-37 (1977).
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Group's proposed screening tribunal. However, there was a noteworthy
difference this time, for the Commission's proposal led to a congressional effort to make it a reality. In December, 1975, six months after
the public release of the Commission's report, Senator Hruska (joined by Senators John McClellan of Arkansas, Quentin Brudick of North
Dakota, and Hiram Fong of Hawaii) introduced a measure to establish
a national court of appeals with both reference-and-transfer
76
jurisdiction-essentially the Commission's proposal. However, the
measure's journey through the legislative process ended in the Senate
77
Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery.
In May, 1976, Hruska, aided by the same cosponsors, tried to
enhance the prospects of the proposed appellate tribunal for Senate
approval by making two revisions in his original bill. One was the
elimination of the transfer jurisdiction, a change which would
transform the recommended tribunal into a judicial body whose cases
came exclusively from the Supreme Court."8 The Nebraska Senator
offered an explanation for this modification:
Whatever the merits of transfer jurisdiction, its most ardent proponents must concede that few, if any, of the Commission's proposals with respect to the national court [of appeals] aroused so intense and so widespread dissent as that directed to transfer [jurisdiction]. Justices of the Supreme Court, with one exception, either
ignored the provision or opposed it. Witnesses at a series of hearings termed the proposal either impracticable or undesirable or both.
Finally, the American Bar Association, acting through its House of
Delegates on the recommendations of its Special Committee on Coordination of Judicial Improvements, while warmly endorsing the proposal for establishing a National Court of Appeals, withheld approval
of the provisions of S. 2762 [the December, 1975, proposal] concerning transfer jurisdiction, at least this time."9
However, he asserted that if a new federal appellate court were
established with only reference jurisdiction but still demonstrated its
worth to the national judicial system, Congress might be inclined to
vest it with transfer jurisdiction."0
A second departure from the original measure was a provision
allowing the President to make two nominations to the proposed seven76. 121 CONG. REC. S39559 (Dec. 10, 1975) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
77. See National Court of Appeals Act, supra note 74, at 201-201; Justice
Department Says No to National Court of Appeals, 60 JUDICATURE 300 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Justice Department].
78. 122 CONG. REC. S13582 (May 12, 1976) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
79. Id. at S13583.
80. Id. at S13583.
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member bench (including the chief judge) rather than all of them.
Hruska conceded the scope of selection under his December, 1975, bill
would have constituted an excessive grant of power to the nation's
chief executive. Moreover, four years after the original nominations
the President, under Hruska's revised bill, would be authorized to
name two additional judges. Four years beyond the second round of
choices, the President would be empowered to nominate the final three
members. Until this process ran its course, some judges would serve
on this bench by designation according to seniority from a list of
eligible, active federal courts of appeals jurists willing to accept such
an assignment. Seniority would also govern the filling of vacancies
involving designated judges."
Neither change in Hruska's initial bill made it attractive enough
for the Senate to pass. The situation was the same in the House of
Representatives, where in February, 1977, Charles Wiggins (a California
congressman and a member of the Commission on the Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System) introduced a measure virtually
identical to Hruska's December, 1975, bill. 82
Three possible explanations may account for the failure of this
national court of appeals proposal in its original and revised versions.
One was the partisan division until January, 1977, in the elective
branches of the national government-a Republican President (Gerald
Ford) and a Democrat-controlled Senate and House which probably
did not want to grant the opposition-party Chief Executive an opportunity to expand his imprint on the national judiciary beyond making nominations to fill vacancies on the existing federal courts.
However, by this logic the attitude of Congress should have changed
when a Democrat, Jimmy Carter, became President in January, 1977.
But it did not, suggesting that an explanation lies elsewhere.
A second possibility is that most members of Congress and the
incoming Chief Executive were indifferent to Hruska's.and Wiggins'
bills, preoccupied with other measures, or broadly sympathetic to the
attitude of President Ford's administration. Its Department of Justice
opposed these measures for three reasons: (1) its doubt that a new
appellate court would really accelerate the disposition of federal litigation; (2) a concern that such a tribunal would lower the prestige of
the federal courts of appeal and impair the morale of their members;
and (3) an absence of any discernible link between the proposed structure and rectification of what the Administration regarded as the crux
of expanding dockets throughout the national court system-namely,
81. Id. at S13584.
82. Wiggins, The National Court of Appeals, 13

TRIAL

36 (Nov. 1977).

1986:11

NATIONAL COURT OF APPEALS

excessive federal jurisdiction. 3 The last reservation, moreover, echoed
one of the bases for opposition expressed by Chief Judge Feinberg
and his colleagues, who wanted to furnish eventual caseload relief
for the nation's highest judicial forum by reducing the intake of litigation into the lower federal courts.8 '
A third possibility is that members of Congress felt inhibited from
passing Senator Hruska's or Representative Wiggins' proposals because
the Supreme Court as well as the rest of the federal judiciary remain
divided on the merits of structural renovation. The letters from the
justices to the Commission on the Federal Court Appellate System
reflected this disunity. Even though Chief Justice Burger and associate
justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., William Rehnquist, and
Byron White expressed sympathy toward the Commission's structural
recommendation, other Supreme Court members (William Brennan,
William Douglas, Thurgood Marshall, and Potter Stewart) were either
critical or skeptical. 85 The previously mentioned opposition of Chief
Judge Feinberg and his colleagues epitomized the views of many jurists
in the lower federal benches.8 Although federal court unity behind
a measure affecting the judicial branch of the national government
does not guarantee its enactment, the absence of such a consensus
virtually assures its defeat.
What is surprising about the proponents of such structural changes
is their tactic of appearing to favor an all-or-nothing approach: either
the Hruska Commission's proposal in one form or another or nothing
at all. They might have first pressed for a gradualist approach, such
as seeking the enactment of non-structural remedies proposed by
Freund Study Group and the Hruska Commission and urging the
Supreme Court to adopt more stringent procedures to manage its
docket more effectively. If this approach failed to arrest the growth
of the Supreme Court's caseload, Hruska, Wiggins, and their supporters would have strengthened their position to argue for a more
drastic level of change: structural renovation. They would not have
incurred the suspicion that their espousal of structural change was
at best premature and at worst redolent of a desire to restrict the
access of indigent and politically weak claimants to the federal court
system and to bring the nation closer to a dual system of justice where
the litigation of those without such access would be handled by alter83. Justice Department, supra note 77.
84. Id.; Feinberg, supra note 71, at 625-28.
85. COMMISSION, supra note 57, at 394-409 (app. D). See also Four Justices
Support New Appeals Court, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1975, at 44, col. 4 (late city ed.).
86. Feinberg, supra note 71, at 611-28.
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native dispute-resolving mechanisms outside the national judiciary.8 7
The non-structural opportunities were considerable. As noted
earlier in this article, the Freund committee had urged an end to direct
Supreme Court appeals from the rulings of three-judge United State
district court panels, a change partially effected in 1976 by legislation
narrowing the scope for such challenges. 8 This group also supported
the establishment of a non-judicial commission to hear prisoner petitions, a still unfulfilled objective. 9 However, the committee's advocacy
of greater Supreme Court staffing has come to fruition. Furthermore,
the number of law clerks permitted each Justice increased from three
to four9" despite the Freund Study Group's opposition, which rested
on its fears of separating work and responsibility for it, weakening
close justice-law clerk working relations, isolating the justices from
one another, and necessitating an overhaul of the Supreme Court
building to accommodate such additional personnel.' Finally, although
not one of its listed recommendations, the Group clearly wanted an
elimination of the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction
(even though it accounted for only a small portion of cases) to grant
this judicial body complete docket control.9 2 Serious legislative efforts
in 1979, 1982, and 1984 to achieve this goal failed, albeit in each
instance after clearing one house of Congress. 3
Proponents of Hruska's and Wiggins' bills might have also reconsidered other non-structural avenues rejected by the Freund committee. For instance, since 1925 the nation's highest bench has required
the approval of at least four justices before granting writs of certiorari: commonly called the rule of four.9 4 This committee had discounted the possibility of initiating a rule of five because the new
87. See, e.g., Gellers, Unequal Access to the Courts, NATION, Jan. 29, 1977,
at 110-113; Nader & Spann, The Justices Slam the Door, NATION, Nov. 12, 1977,
at 495-98; States Favor Mediation over Litigation, PUB. AD. TIMES, July 1, 1985,
at 3, cols. 1-4.
88. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82, 2284 (1978).
89. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 597, 611.
90. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 582; Williams, Justices Run 'Nine
Little Law Firms' at Supreme Court, SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1977, at 85, col. 2; H. JACOB
JUSTICES IN AMERICA 243 (4th ed. 1984); 21 U.S.C. § 675 (1982).
91. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note 2, at 582, 610-12.
92. Id. at 592.
93. See, e.g., Measures to Ease Court Workload Approved, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., 1889 (1984); Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 35 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 396, 399
(1979); Mandatory Jurisdiction, 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 395-96 (1982); Mandatory
Jurisdiction Bill, 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 260 (1984); Burger Again Asks Congress
for Help, 42 CONG. Q WEEKLY REP., 87 (1985).
94. STUDY GROUP REP., supra note at 606.
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practice would probably fail to reduce the Court's docket enough to
justify abrogating the principle that a minority of justices should be
able to force the entire court to give plenary review to any petition
coming before this body.9" The Study Group also dismissed the
possibility of raising the level of consent to six because it might be
unconvtitutional as a violation of the Supreme Court's duty to decide
matters coming before it by majority vote.1 6 Paradoxically, the rule
of six might have aggravated the Court's workload since the justices
would probably have needed to spend far more time in choosing cases
for their reduced docket.
Furthermore, advocates of Hruska's and Wiggins' measures might
have explored another non-structural proposal reluctantly discarded
by the Freund Study Group: an extension of the annual terms for
the Supreme Court's official business, which runs from the first
Monday in October to late June or early July. The Group clearly
perceived the disadvantages of the present duration of official work:
pressures on the justices to decide some cases prematurely in order
to clear the docket and to be hastily agreeable or recalcitrant due
to a lack of time to discuss litigation with colleagues and possibly
to reach accommodations. But Professor Freund and his colleagues
endorsed a continuation of this status quo, for it disciplined the justices
to avoid backlogs while affording them a few months during each
year to ruminate on some of the business facing them. 7
Although the Freund Study Group concentrated its attention on
the rule of four and the length of the Supreme Court's term, there
are other possible non-structural measures that it did not consider.
Such proposals included the use of three-justice panels to screen petitions with unanimous votes of denial binding on the Supreme Court,
the pooling of law clerks to do this job, the establishment of a senior
central staff to perform such screening, a resort to increased filing
costs to reduce frivolous paid (as opposed to in forma pauperis) requests for review, and a confirmed use of case law to discourage particular kinds of filings. 8
Finally, those favoring a Hruska Commission-type national court
of appeals might have also looked at the non-structural proposals made
95. Id. at 606-07.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 607.
98. See, e.g., Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium of Proposals To Reduce
the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307, 319-20 (1983); Supreme
Court Workload: Hearings on H.R. 1968 before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Workload].

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

by this advisory body. Even though they pertained directly to the
federal courts of appeal, some of them may have been adaptable to
the nation's highest bench. For example, the Commission's report suggests possible ways of reducing the role of oral arguments, limiting
opinion writing, and delving into the possibility of a central staff to
conduct research for the whole Court, to prepare memoranda on cases
for all the justices, and to oversee the flow of judicial business."
Although the mere enumeration of these non-structural steps, like the
ones of the Freund Study Group, does not demonstrate their validity,
this list still suggests the variety of possibilities short of drastic change
open to those who wanted to reduce the Supreme Court's work while
enlarging the appellate capacity of the federal judiciary.
V.

A THIRD STAGE: AN INTERCIRCUIT ALTERNATIVE

In February 1983 Chief Justice Burger used his annual speech
to the American Bar Association on the state of the national judiciary
to review his quest for a new federal intermediate appellate court.' 0
He chose this time to pursue structural renovation because the members
of the Supreme Court were becoming increasingly bothered by its growing caseload, which had reached a record level of 5,311 for the
1981-1982 term.' 0 ' Eight of them were upset enough to speak out in
public, although they remained disunited on possible remedies.' 2
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens even went so far as to advocate
a national court of appeals empowered not only to screen petitions,
as the Freund Study Group envisioned, but also to grant or deny
writs of certiorari. 0 3 In this atmosphere the Chief Justice may have
believed that the moment was ripe to try again.
However, Burger's advocacy of structural change manifested two
novel features. First, he specifically endorsed a particular kind of structure whereas in the past he had simply given general approval to the
idea of a new appellate tribunal without intimating whether he favored
0 4
a screening, reference, or transfer court or a fusion of the latter two.'
Maybe Burger had hoped that his refusal to express a structural
99. COMMISSION, supra note 57, at 253-62.
100. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A.J. 442
(1983).
101. ANN. REP. DIRECTOR AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. 227 (Table A-I) (1984) [hereinafter
cited as ANN. REP. (1984)].
102. Rx for an Overburdened Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 404-05. See
also Supreme Court Workload, supra note 98, at 306-423 (app. i).
103. Stevens, Some Thoughts on JudicialRestraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 181-82
(1982).
104. Burger, supra note 100, at 447; Greenhouse, Burger Proposes a New Panel
to Cut High Court's Load, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1983, at I, col. 6.
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preference might dispel skepticism in the American legal community
about his motives, facilitate debate, and help bring about a consensus for a specific proposal to which he would lend public support.
If he actually pursued this tactic, a decade of experience must have
convinced him of its ineffectiveness.
Second, the Chief Justice lowered his expectations for appellate
change in the federal judicial system by publicly espousing a proposal
less far-reaching than the structural recommendations made by the
Freund Study Group and the Hruska Commission. Instead of
advocating a new judicial tier, as those advisory bodies had done,
he urged the establishment of an appendage to an existing federal court:
I propose that without waiting for any further study, a special, but

temporary panel of the new United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit be created. This special temporary panel, which I

now propose, could be added to that court for administrative purpose. It should have special and narrow jurisdiction to decide all
intercircuit conflicts and a limited five-year existence.",

Burger's proposal was significant because it reflected a traditional
mode of federal judicial organizational change-namely, a resort to
specialized tribunals for which American history supplies successful
precedents, such as the previous mentioned United States Court of
Military Appeals and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.' 06
In addition, the Chief Justice's proposal signified even further restraint
because it was a recommended specialized adjunct to a specialized
tribunal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
established in 1982 to exercise nationwide jurisdiction over claims
against the United States, customs cases, and patent infringements.' °7
His recommended panel was mainly to handle all disputes where at
least two federal courts of appeal had reached different conclusions
on the same issue (intercircuit conflict).' 8 Although he also mentioned
"possibly, in addition, a defined category of statutory interpretation
cases"' 0 9 without elaboration, the Supreme Court would be authorized to refer such business to this panel." '
Chief Justice Burger's proposed intercircuit panel was to consist
of seven or nine jurists selected from a pool of twenty-six federal
105. Burger, supra note 100, at 447.
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courts of appeal judges (two from each of the thirteen circuits).'"
In May, 1983, he announced a revised plan narrowing the pool to
thirteen jurists (or one per circuit), nine of whom would serve for
six months on the new court with the remaining four judges in
reserve.'' 2 He explained the alterations as an effort to "simplify the
structure somewhat" ' 3 and presumably make it more enticing to
lawmakers.
However, Burger failed to indicate precisely who would decide
which jurists became members of the pool and which of these candidates would become intercircuit judges. At first he intimated that
he might be permitted to designate judges for the proposed panel until
authority was granted to him by Congress. He noted that it had allowed the Chief Justice of the United States to name members of the
various specialized courts and that the nation's highest judicial officer had named over fifty or sixty judges to these positions.'" Later
he used the word we without precision to denote the source of pool
selection and choices from the pool.'' 5
The Chief Justice envisioned that the proposed intercircuit panel,
if enacted, would relieve the Supreme Court of "as many as 35 to
50 cases a year from the argument calendar . . . "'I6 He noted that,
between 1980 and 1983, the nation's highest bench had decided an
average of forty-two intercircuit conflicts a year-all of which it would
have referred to such a panel if it had been in existence.'' 7 Furthermore, the new tribunal's decisions would be applicable to the Supreme
Court, although he speculated that it would seldom consent to hear
such challenges.'' 8 However, he failed to consider the possibility that
it would have at least to give cursory attention to such appeals before
deciding whether to accord them plenary review, a task that might
require more time than handling in forma pauperis petitions.
Even though the Chief Justice's plan was less drastic than the
structured proposals of the Freund Study Group and the Hruska Commission, it experienced the same result: congressional inaction. Like
its structural precursors, it drew largely unfavorable reactions in the
legal community and in the general public. Although former Senator
Hruska endorsed,' 9 Professor Emeritus Freund implicitly discounted
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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119.
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it as part of his resistance to any "intermediate court for all statutory
construction questions as distinguished from constitutional questions
• . . ,,'20 He cited a pair of reasons for his stance: a tendency of
statutory and constitutional issues to be deeply entwined, if not inextricable, and his fear that the Supreme Court justices with only constitutional issues before them would be even more inclined to be "superlegislators""'2 and to experience fewer restraints on letting their political
and social values influence their decisions.
The most comprehensive critique came from Arthur Hellman, a
law professor and former deputy director of the Hruska Commission, who leveled a potpourri of allegations against the Chief Justice's
proposal. Some of Hellman's charges were reminiscent of those leveled
against the Hruska Commission's proposed national court of appeals:
added work for the Supreme Court due to its reference responsibilities,
the threat to the Court from a docket with only constitutional issues,
a paucity of enough genuine intercircuit conflicts to warrant the
establishment of another judicial body, no guarantee of caseload relief
as long as the certification of litigation depended on the rule of four,
and no prospect for achieving a greater degree of certainty in the
law. However, other complaints were new: no correlation between
smaller Supreme Court dockets and sounder holdings and uncertainty
about the mode of choosing intercircuit panelists. 2'2 In addition, a
well-known former federal court of appeals judge, Shirley Hufstedler
reportedly feared that the panel's temporary status as a five year
experiment would impair its effectiveness, presumably by keeping it
from developing a stable membership and case law. '23
Like the reactions of the legal community to the Chief Justice's
proposal, the public reaction, as manifested in the national press, was
generally critical. For example, The Washington Post,'24 the Los
Angeles Times,'25 and USA Today'2 6 endorsed Burger's recommendation in their editorials mostly because of its promise of caseload
120. Id.at 403.
121. Id.at 404.
122. Hellman, How Not to Help the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A.J. 750 (1983).
See also Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity, 67 JUDICATURE 28
(1983).
123. Hufstedler, Justice in a Logjam, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1983, part 4, at
5, cols. 3-5 (San Diego County ed.).
124. Editorial, Appeal from the Chief Justice, Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1983,
at 12, col. 1.
125. Editorial, Friend of the Court, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1983, part 2, at 8,
col. 1.
126. Editorial, Only Nine Justices, and They Need Help, USA Today, Feb. 10,
1983, at 10A, col. 1.
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relief for the Supreme Court, although The Washington Post reminded
its audience that the impetus for Chief Justice Burger's proposal
stemmed from the public complaint voiced by seven of the justices
during the last half of 1982.127 However, The New York Times,'28
the Chicago Tribune'29 and The San Diego Union'30 editorially chastised
his suggested judicial structure while three national magazines,
Newsweek,'"' Time,' 32 and U.S. News and World Report' carried
stories largely unfavorable to this proposal.
The objections raised in the press ran parallel to those expressed
in the legal community in two respects-the alleged lack of a compelling case for the proffered structure and the apprehension about
putative harmful effects on the nation's highest court. However, there
was one salient difference: some of the media criticism held the
Supreme Court itself mostly responsible for its expanding caseload.
In this view, although the Court lacked control over the number of
petitions coming to its doors, it still could control its docket through
denying writs of certiorari. If the justices felt burdened, they should
first seek to put their own house in order through stringent internal
practices before calling for drastic redress, as exemplified by recommendations for a new federal appellate court. Furthermore, some opponents feared that if federal judicial appellate capacity were increased,
caseloads would grow to use up this addition.' 34 The result would
illustrate a fulfillment of Parkinson's Law, which posits that work
expands to fill the time-in this instance, capacity-available for its
completion.' 35
Among the suggested managerial palliatives were an examination
of the justices' work habits to make them more efficient, greater care
in screening petitions, as well as fewer and shorter separate opinions.
The accomplishment of the last proposal might consume more of the
justices' time, since reaching accommodations among such typically
127. Editorial, supra note 124, at 12, col. 2.
128. Editorial, No Need for a Sub-Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1983,
at 30, col. i.
129. Editorial, A Semi-Supreme Court?, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 14, 1983, at
16, col. 1.
130. Editorial, Back to Last Resort, San Diego Union, Feb. 14, 1983, at B-9,
col.. 1.
131. The Court's Clogged Arteries, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 1983, at 81-82.
132. Once More with Feeling, TIME, Feb. 21, 1983, at 58.
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autonomous jurists to form a single majority opinion and one minority
opinion, if any, would often prove difficult. 36 However, there was
support in the press for a jurisdictional change: the elimination of
the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, which, incidentially, is one of the few points on which exponents and adversaries
of structural renovation have agreed over the years.
The renewed debate over a possible alteration in the federal
judicial structure extended beyond the legal community and the press
and embraced the legislative sphere. In March, 1983, (a month after
the Chief Justice's first public advancement of the intercircuit proposal), Senate and House members sponsored bills to effectuate it.
Introducing the Senate measure was Robert Dole of Kansas (now
Majority Leader) with Howell Heflin (a former chief justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court) and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina
(the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee) as co-sponsors. This
version essentially mirrored the Chief Justice's proposal of February,
1983, except for the number of judges, panels of five instead of seven
or nine, formed from a pool of twenty-six federal courts of appeal
jurists. Dole's bill also offered the Supreme Court administrative relief
(the right of the Chief Justice to choose an administrative aide, to
be called Chancellor of the United States, from the federal courts
of appeal) and jurisdictional help (an end to the Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction as well as an elimination of most direct appeals
to the Supreme Court from three-judge federal district court panels).' 3
Shortly after Senator Dole introduced his measure, Representative
Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, with eighteen co-sponsors, submitted
a bill to establish an intercircuit panel.' 3 8 However, this proposal differed in four respects from its Senate counterpart. First, it provided
for a pool consisting of fourteen to twenty-two judges, not twentysix. Second, Kastenmeier's proposed judicial body would -sit en banc
rather than as five-member penals. Third, his measure authorized the
judicial councils of each circuit (their administrative arms) to designate
the members of the new court. By contrast, Dole's bill contained a
system for drawing lots to select the jurists from the pool of twentysix. Fourth, Kastenmeier's proposal, while furnishing the same kind
of relief from mandating appeals, also included a broader form of
jurisdictional relief: the elimination of diversity of citizenship as a
basis for filing cases in United States district courts.' 39 The latter
136. See
137. 129
138. 129
Kastenmeier).
139. Id.
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category accounted for approximately one fourth of the suits entering these trial courts. ' A restriction on this kind of intake would
have lessened the number of petitions advancing to the federal courts
of appeal and eventually reaching the Supreme Court. This proposed
eradication received unanimous support from the nation's highest
judicial body.
Kastenmeier took an additional step to generate wider support
for his efforts. As chair of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, he scheduled four hearings
between April and November, 1983, and called fourteen witnesses from
the judicial and broader legal community, representing a broad spectrum of outlooks.'' The call for testimony was significant because
it marked the first time since 1976 and 1977 that a proposal for federal
judicial structural change had advanced to this point. As mentioned
earlier,' 2 the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
in 1976 had conducted hearings on Senator Hruska's proposed national
court of appeals. In 1977, Kastenmeier's subcommittee had also taken
corresponding action toward Representative Wiggins' bill.'"3 In 1983,
as in the past, the witnesses favored the elimination of the Supreme
Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction but split sharply on the advisability of setting up an intercircuit tribunal.'
Again, the arguments for and against this proposed structure made
at these sessions were mostly restatements of positions expressed by
the same or different witnesses at previous hearings. For instance,
Chief Judge Feinberg reiterated the views that had impelled him and
his colleagues to oppose Senator Hruska's proposed court.' 5 Supporters like former Representative Charles Wiggins of California essentially repeated earlier contentions.'4 6 This sense of deja vu undoubtedly
contributed to legislative inaction on the proposed intercircuit panel,
although in June, 1983, the Senate Judiciary Courts Subcommittee
approved Senator Dole's measure.'4 7
This proposed structural change suffered defeat because of
widespread doubts in the legal community about its need and efficacy,
basically the same reservations that bedeviled the Freund and Hruska
efforts. Furthermore, the Reagan administration helped to seal the
140.
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fate of the Dole and Kastenmeier bills, for without the President's
strong support, Congress was unlikely to move toward enactment of
either measure. Even though a Department of Justice committee of
assistant attorneys general favored an intercircuit tribunal with reference
jurisdiction, the White House declined to endorse this committee's
position. 11
The outlook of the Administration toward the latest structural
proposal consisted of three facets. First, it agreed that the Supreme
Court had been experiencing a severe workload problem, which it
attributed chiefly to a pair of causes: the growing litigiousness of
citizens and alleged judicial activism pervading the federal system,
including the Supreme Court. To the Reagan Administration, the latter
aggravated the former. Increased judicial activism engendered the filing of additional cases. Furthermore, one Administration representative, Jonathan Rose (the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Policy) also blamed Congress for enacting nebulous laws and economic
regulations and previous administrations for encouraging such actions,
all of which fueled the caseload problems of the federal bench, including the Supreme Court. However, he denied that federal governmental policy to relitigate questions had contributed to the burdens
of the nation's highest court.' 4 9
Second, the Reagan administration voiced a variety of concerns
about the efficacy of the proposed intercircuit tribunal to lighten the
Supreme Court's docket. For instance, another Administration
spokesperson, William Bradford Reynolds (the Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Right Division) feared that the new tribunal, rather
than serving as a temporary expedient, might readily become permanent after the experimental five-year period despite automatic sunsetting. Although he cited "inertial tendencies" for his position,
perhaps he really shared Professor Hellman's apprehension that the
new court would persist indefinitely as long as it was not an obvious
failure. Reynolds also made the familiar charge that the new tribunal
might aggravate the workload of the Supreme Court, which would
have to determine the suitability of cases for reference as well as handle
appeals for the intercircuit court. Furthermore, he speculated that selection of the new tribunal's membership by the Chief Justice or the
entire Supreme Court would give either or both excessive power to
shape its direction. Finally, he shared Paul Freund's concern that the
148. See Supreme Court Workload, supra note 98 at 461-65.
149. Id. at 210-15, 224-25, 238-39, 466. Incidentially, the most comprehensive
treatment of judicial activism may be found in Canon, Defining the Dimensions of
Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236 (1983).
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existence of the new tribunal would foster greater Supreme Court
activism, for the latter's docket would consist mainly or exclusively
of constitutional issues. Thus, for the Administration structural renovation was a last resort, an option to be exercised only after other
approaches had failed."'
Third, the principal solution to the Supreme Court's expanding
calendar lay in a series of non-structural steps to limit the rush of
suits into the national court system. Reynolds encapsulated the
Administration's answer when he commented, in part:
• . . the creation of another court treats only a symptom and not
the cause of the major problem which confronts our judicial system
and our society generally. That problem is the explosion of
litigation-the propensity of Americans to seek a judicial solution
for every private conflict and social need-which has occurred in
recent decades. Rather than responding with more and more federal
judges, and now a new court, the emphasis should be on promoting
an increased measure of judicial self-discipline so that litigiousness
is discouraged rather than accommodated. . . .the burgeoning
Supreme Court docket is part of a large problem that affects the
whole judicial system. It is best remedied by reducing the flow of
cases into and through the federal system. An end to diversity
jurisdiction, revitalization of justiciability doctrines constraining
judicial activism, clearer, more concise judicial opinions, and a review
of proposed statutes [sic] for their litigative impact, are but a few
of the ways that that objective can be achieved. Rather than rushing
to endorse the creation of a new tribunal, we might be better advised
to focus public attention on the underlying factors . . . the real impediments of lasting relief."'
As a result of divisions in the legal community and the
Administration's opposition, it is not surprising that the proposed intercircuit panel failed. However, the inability to enact non-structural
changes is astonishing in light of the consensus on their- desirability.
The reasons probably include other Administration and congressional
priorities, the addition of eighty-five new federal judgeships (sixtyone for the district courts and twenty-four for the courts of appeal)
as a part of bankruptcy legislation passed in 1984, ' and an uneven
but significant decline in the Supreme Court's caseload over the last
three years from a peak of 5,311 during the 1981 term. '
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151. Id. at 466-67.
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In 1985 before several audiences Chief Justice Burger revived his
pursuit of the intercircuit panel that he had recommended two years
earlier.' 54 Senator Thurmond, with ten co-sponsors, cooperated in introducing an appropriate bill.'" However, this time the political
atmosphere was less favorable, ranging from apathy to hostility toward
not only this proposal but also his other recommendations. For
example, one critic argued that intercircuit disputes were really one
kind of litigation which the Supreme Court should handle and that
the Court did not need his proposed tenth justice who would have
exclusively managerial duties since he already had a full-time ad56
ministration assistant to shoulder some of his non-judicial functions.
Other legal analysts scored the nation's highest bench for accepting
numerous cases (as much as one-fourth of its docket) which allegedly
did not merit its plenary attention and stemmed from failing to institute clearer and stricter standards for granting certification. They
further suggested that the Court refrained from promulgating such
policies because it wanted to reach out for some kinds of cases, providing opportunities to reverse objectionable lower court rulings,
especially in criminal cases; to show deference toward the Solicitor
General of the Untied States (Rex Lee, a philosophical ally); aid to
oversee state court activism.' 7
Finally, in May, 1985, the Chief Justice reiterated his plea for
an intercircuit panel at the American Newspaper Publishers Convention.' 58 However, that month he also furnished an indication of a
belief that he may have waged his campaign for such structural reform
as strongly as possible without becoming excessively repetitive and
tiresome. That month, even though his latest annual comments to
the American Law Institute in May, 1985, offered him still another
forum to restate his plea for such a structure, he chose to discuss
other topics like the advisability of eliminating jury trials for some
kinds of civil cases, including automobile-accident suits, and the
possibility of establishing extra-judicial mechanisms as alternative ways
of resolving disputes. To him numerous cases might be diverted from
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the federal judicial system in arbitration proceedings, mediation panels,

and neighborhood courts.119
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the thirteen-year-old controversy over
the desirability of a national court of appeals to help remedy the
Supreme Court's growing caseload, to increase federal judicial appellate
capacity or both. The central theme of this study has been that the
intermittent but spirited debate over the advisability of this proposed
structure has evolved through three stages, each of which has involved less drastic recommendations. These stages (each one constituting
a section of this article) include: (1) advocacy of a structure to screen
the Supreme Court's caseload, (2) pressure for a tribunal to augment
federal court appellate capacity by hearing cases referred to it by the
nation's highest court or transferred to it from the various federal
courts of appeal, and (3) espousal of a new specialized court, an intercircuit tribunal.
As a result, a consensus has started to emerge, rejecting not such
proposed structural changes as premature, unnecessary, and inefficacious but also other legislative efforts to supply relief to the
Supreme Court and the rest of the federal judiciary. The organizational status quo in the national court system will almost certainly
persist indefinitely, particularly if the Supreme Court's caseload does
not resume its climb. Thus the nation's highest court has been left
with no practical choice but to help itself as much as possible (perhaps
in collaboration with lower national courts) if it continues to feel overburdened by its docket.
Consequently, to lighten its docket, the Court may have to consider seriously the melange of possible changes in its internal management practices cited earlier in this article. Perhaps their individual
and collective drawbacks, with regard to practicality and fairness, may
outweigh their benefits. But in light of the dim prospect for any kind
of legislative rescue, the nation's highest bench may have to travel
this route.
However, Chief Justice Burger, in his most recent address on
the state of the federal judiciary, reacted strongly to the suggestion
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in the legal community that the Supreme Court is principally responsible for the condition of its docket. He protested:
One writer on this subject of the Supreme Court caseload referred to our present burden as a "self-inflicted wound." This
criticism was repeated before Congress. I must say, however, that
criticism of the Court from practicing lawyers for granting too many
that we
certs [sic] is rare, but I have read a good deal of criticism
60
do not grant certain cases that ought to be granted.'
Unfortunately for the country's highest judicial officer, a large segment
of the nation's lawyers, judges, and elected officials have yet to
embrace his remonstration.
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